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Globally, more than half the attempts at making a democratic constitution have failed to produce 
one. Another large number of constitutions have suffered the ignominy of having a draft made 
and implemented, but ultimately being rejected by the populace or political elites for failing to 
perform its intended functions. A curious case emerges in instances when would-be-autocrats 
draft authoritarian constitutions in democratic regimes. They do it rather successfully. Moreover, 
they do so without using force, with the consent of large sections of the society, and in ostensibly 
democratic ways. The question that then arises is how would-be-autocrats are more successful 
than their democratic counterparts in such ventures. Using three varied examples of authoritarian 
constitution-making from Hungary, Venezuela, and Turkey, this article will examine the ‘method 
and madness’ behind the success of would-be autocrat’s constitution-making endeavors and these 
authoritarian constitutions’ acceptance by the populace. 
 






INDEX: 1. Prologue. 2. How to Successfully Draft a Constitution? 2.1 The Process of 
Constitution-Making. 2.2 The Design of the Constitution. 3. Authoritarian Constitution 
Making in Democratic Regimes. 3.1 Venezuela (Authoritarian Constitution-Making by 
Bypassing the Existing Legal System). 3.2 Hungary (Authoritarian Constitution Within 
the Existing Legal System). 3.3 Turkey (Constitution-Making Through Ordinary 
Constitutional Amendments). 4. Conducting an Autopsy - Why Are Would-Be Autocrats 
Successful in Making Authoritarian Constitutions? 4.1 Several Elements of A Successful 
Constitution-Making Process. 4.2 Absence of Any Nonconformity Issues. 4.3 Workable 
Constitutions. 4.4 Failure of Constitutional Safeguards and Institutional Checks. 4.5 Lack 
of United Opposition Forces. 5. Epilogue. 
 
                                                 
Fellow, Faculty of Law, University of Hamburg. The author would like to thank Aditya Phalnikar, Karthik 
Rai, Sumit Chatterjee, and Vasu Aggarwal for their excellent assistance on this article and the larger project. 
The author would also like to thank the participants at the ICON:S Mundo Conference’s Panel on 
‘Democratic Backsliding, Making, and Changing The Constitution’ for their valuable comments. 
Furthermore, the author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their pertinent feedback and 
observations. The essay was submitted to double blind peer review. Member of the Editorial Team who 





Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie:  
Diritto, Istituzioni, Società  
 
 




1. Prologue  
After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the number of democracies worldwide 
increased yearly1. Democracy was perhaps “the only game in town”, and it seemed like 
there was no turning back. For a couple of years, this seemed accurate before things took 
an ugly turn. Since the mid-2000s, the trend of global democratization has reversed2. The 
number of democracies has started diminishing at an alarming rate3. Even in established 
democracies, the quality of democracy has seen constant deterioration4. Countries like the 
United States of America and France, which were models to replicate for centuries, started 
to show chinks in their armor. In recent years, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Democracy Index has demoted both these countries from full democracies to flawed 
democracies5. 
This time around, the demise of democracies is happening in ways never seen before. 
Rather than coups accompanied by an instant democratic breakdown, democracy is being 
subverted in multiple stages using the veneer of law and legality in a practice termed by 
Javier Corrales as “autocratic legalism”6. One of the chief tactics of “autocratic legalism” 
is substituting democratic constitutions with authoritarian7 ones8. Several countries that 
were well on the path to democratic consolidation now have authoritarian  constitutions9. 
These include European Union and OECD members such as Hungary. Likewise, Poland 
has been mooting plans to follow suit. Currently, Sri Lanka is in the process of drafting 
one. 
Though scholars have started identifying this trend, there is a scant understanding of 
the mechanisms and processes by which would-be-autocrats draft authoritarian 
constitutions in democratic regimes and the reasons behind the success of their drafting 
endeavors. There is a lesser understanding of what can be done to prevent this from 
happening. This article will investigate the former with minor initial directions for 
addressing the latter.  
The rest of this article proceeds as follows: Part 2 examines how to draft a constitution 
successfully, irrespective of whether it is a democratic or an authoritarian constitution. 
                                                 
1Freedom in the World 2018, Freedom House, Washington DC, 2018, 8.   
2M. Loughlin, The Contemporary Crisis of Constitutional Democracy, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
Vol. 35, No. 2, 2019, 436-437.  
3Freedom in the World 2019, Freedom House, Washington DC, 2019, 1.   
4Freedom in the World 2018, cit., 1-3. 
5Democracy Index 2020, Economic Intelligence Unit, London, 2020, 9.  
6J. Corrales, Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2015, 38–45. 
7By “authoritarian” I refer to a system of government that is characterized generally by elements such as 
(1) centralized power (2) rejection of political plurality (3) erosion of the rule of law, separation of powers, 
and democratic voting procedures. These characteristics of an authoritarian government have been 
identified by Furio Cerutti in F. Cerutti, Conceptualizing Politics: An Introduction to Political Philosophy, 
Routledge, London, 2017, 17. Additionally, while democracy has far too many connotations and no single 
acceptable definition (on this point see C. Tilly, Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007, 1-25), for the purposes of this article, democracy or democratic is used as the antonym of autocracy 
or authoritarian. 
8K. L. Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, in University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, 2018, 545-
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This discussion is imperative before we proceed to understand how authoritarian 
constitutions have been drafted in democratic regimes. Part 3 briefly describes the story 
of three successful examples of authoritarian constitution-making in democratic regimes: 
Venezuela, Hungary, and Turkey. This part will also detail the reasons for choosing these 
examples. Part 4 tries to unpack why modern would-be-autocrats have had success in 
drafting authoritarian constitutions. Part 5 provides concluding remarks.  
2. How To Successfully Draft A Constitution 
Constitution-making often accompanies the process of decolonizing. States transiting 
to a democratic regime promulgate new constitutions. Would-be-autocrats draft new 
constitutions to consolidate power and forward their authoritarian projects. Constitutions 
are made as essential components of peacebuilding in countries recuperating from a 
violent conflict. Existing democratic regimes write new constitutions for motivations 
such as modernization or additional democratization.  
In most modern instances, constitutions are intended to serve two core functions. 
Firstly, to lay down the mechanisms and institutions for exercising and sharing public 
power10. Secondly, for symbolic and moral purposes, such as expressions of a country’s 
statehood, shared commitments, and highest values11. 
Unfortunately, the majority of constitution-making attempts are not successful12. More 
than fifty percent of attempts at making constitutions do not end up producing a final 
draft13. This generally happens when negotiations between major groups involved in the 
constitution-making breakdown, and they cannot reach adequate compromises14. In some 
cases, though a constitution is drafted, it does not come into force15. This has occurred 
even in established democracies like Iceland, where core groups of elites held out and 
prevented a new constitution from coming into force when it was not to their liking16.  
At times constitution-making attempts are not successful, although a constitution is 
drafted and enforced. This happens when constitutions fail at performing one of their core 
functions. As will be discussed later, this can occur when the constitution-making 
processes result in constitutions that are unacceptable to the bulk of the populace and core 
elites or provide inept means of power-sharing.  
Cases of constitution-making gone wrong can result in “back to square one” scenarios. 
For example, when it comes to democratic constitution-making, about 60 percent of 
                                                 
10M. Tushnet, Constitution-Making: An Introduction, in Texas Law Review, Vol. 91, 2013, 1983-1984.  
11Ibidem. 
12Successful here refers to a constitution-making attempt that has to a fair degree the following four 
characteristics (1) results in producing a constitution; (2) produces a constitution with workable power-
sharing arrangements; (3) produces a constitution that is accepted by a significant section of the populace 
and/or core elites; (4) produces a constitution that does not face calls by a significant section of the populace 
and/or core elites to be replaced shortly after its drafting.     
13M. Brandt, J. Cottrell, Y. Ghai, A. Regan, Constitution-Making and Reform Options for The Process, 
Interpeace, Switzerland, 2011, 75. 
14Ibidem.  
15Ibidem. 
16A. Hudson, When Does Public Participation Make a Difference? Evidence From Iceland's Crowdsourced 
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societies are unable to sustain democracy17. At times, within a short period from the 
promulgation of a new constitution, there are calls for another constitution, as the recently 
drafted constitution is rejected by a majority of core elites and the populace. In more 
extreme cases, unsuccessful constitution-making attempts can lead to an outbreak of 
violence. Forty percent of post-conflict countries revert to violence within a decade of 
their attempts at constitution-making18. Though exogenous factors relating to the social, 
economic, and political environment in which a constitution operates do have a significant 
role (and often the primary role) in the latter outcomes19, sub-optimal constitution-making 
processes and/or constitutional design choices can considerably amplify them20. Even 
when circumstances exist for a constitution to be successful, sub-optimal constitution-
making processes or constitutional design choices can lead to a constitution failing to 
perform its core functions21. 
While this is an almost impossible task (and one that does not have an acceptable or a 
“one size fits all” answer), I will discuss some of the minimum factors scholarly literature 
recognizes as vital for making a constitution successfully22. These general claims help set 
the scene for the discussion that follows. For organizational efficiency, I will discuss them 
under two heads (1) the process of constitution-making and (2) the design of the 
constitution. One qualification for this part is that it will only briefly address potential 
ways to avoid constitution-making going wrong since that is not the focus of this article. 
Moreover, this part will generally discuss how to successfully draft a constitution 
irrespective of its nature, whether democratic or authoritarian.  
 2.1 The Process of Constitution-Making  
To start with, constitutions need to be drafted and adopted in ways conducive to their 
eventual success. Elites and citizens will push for a constitution and subsequently abide 
by and fight for its enforcement if they are attached to it23. Attachment to a constitution 
usually flows from a constitution-making process that is inclusive of all core groups in a 
society24. One way of guaranteeing inclusiveness is by ensuring democratic elections to 
constituent assemblies (or similar drafting bodies)25. Jennifer Widner’s quantitative 
                                                 
17S. Levitsky, L. Way, The New Competitive Authoritarianism, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 31, No. 1, 
2020, 51-52. 
18P. Collier, Wars, Guns, And Votes, Harper Collins, New York, 2010, 75. 
19The argument here is that optimally making a constitution can counteract to some degree non conducive 
exogeneous factors and likewise can result in far better outcomes in those situations where exogeneous 
factors are conducive to making a constitution.     
20Z. Elkins, T Ginsburg, J. Milton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009, 2-5.  
21C. Saunders, International Involvement In Constitution Making, in D. Landau, H. Lerner (Eds.), 
Comparative Constitution Making, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham: UK, 2019, 84-88. 
22There are obviously other factors that the ones described here that impact the success of the constitution. 
Nonetheless, if these factors are not present, most other factors do not even come into play. For example, 
one such factor could be that different core groups get a fair chance to bargain at the constitution-making 
table. However, if they are not present at the table, the question of them getting a fair chance becomes moot. 
23Z. Elkins, T Ginsburg, J. Milton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, cit., 78.   
24Ibidem.  
25J. Elster, Ways Of Constitution-Making in Democracy’s Victory and Crisis, in A. Hadenius (Ed.), 





Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie:  
Diritto, Istituzioni, Società  
 
 
n. 2/2021 ISSN 2612-6672 | DOI 10.13130/2612-6672/16631 | 5  
 
 
research on post-conflict constitution-making demonstrates how outbreaks of violence 
decreased or did not increase in over 78 percent of cases where members of drafting 
bodies were democratically elected26. If core groups are excluded from the drafting 
process, it could impact elite and citizen attachment to a constitution and its eventual 
success. The recent constitution-making processes in Iraq, Libya, and Egypt led to worst-
case scenarios because core groups were excluded from the constitution-making process 
or were made to accept certain choices by threats of force27. David Landau and Andrew 
Arato have gone so far as arguing that in cases of democratic constitution-making, even 
negotiating with undemocratic actors who hold substantial sway in a society will result in 
favorable outcomes and that a failure to do so may result in a return to authoritarianism 
or the outbreak of violence28. 
To further facilitate attachment to a constitution, the constitution-making process 
could involve the public directly by seeking participation through elections to constituent 
assemblies, referendums to trigger a constituent assembly or ratify a constitution, public 
discussions through primary assemblies, community workshops, the internet, etc. In all 
cases of constitution-making since 1789, where the process was participatory, the 
resulting constitution was five times more likely to endure29. Yet, despite the importance 
of popular participation, in the 194 cases of constitution-making since 1975 (a plurality 
of them being democratic), only one-third involved some form of popular participation30.  
Nevertheless, there is a small caveat. Scholars have asserted that direct popular 
participation during constitution-making can be detrimental to a constitution’s creation 
and, among other things, lead to increased transaction costs, polarization, and 
deadlocks31. At times secrecy is necessary to strike the hard bargains needed in 
constitution-making32. Nevertheless, even when public participation can be detrimental 
to outcomes, constitutions need to be drafted in ways that ensure that the core groups of 
elites are adequately represented in their drafting and adoption. Scholars argue that this is 
a far more indispensable element to the success of constitution-making than popular 
participation33. Ana María Bejarano and Renata Segura state how the composition of the 
drafting body is important in determining whether the public perceives the constitution-
                                                 
26J. Widner, Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution, in The Round Table, Vol. 94, No. 381, 2005, 
511. 
27N. Brown, The Unsurprising but Distinctive Nature of Constitution Writing in The Arab World, in D. 
Landau, H. Lerner (Eds.), Comparative Constitution Making, cit., 457-458. 
28D. Landau, Constituent Power and Constitution Making in Latin America, in D. Landau, H. Lerner (Eds.), 
Comparative Constitution Making, cit., 558. 
29Z. Elkins, T Ginsburg, J. Milton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, cit., 147-214.    
30J. Widner, Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution, cit. 
31C. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, 13-
48; D. Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, in Alabama Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 5, 2013, 923-980; 
W. Partlett, The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making, in Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 
38, No. 1, 2012,.193-238. 
32J. Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, in Duke Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 
2, 1995, 395. 
33G. Negretto, Replacing Constitutions in Democratic Regimes: Elite Cooperation and Citizen 
Participation, in G. Negretto (Ed.), Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic Regimes, Cambridge 
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making process as legitimate34. Therefore, all attempts must be made in a given 
constitution-making process to ensure that the drafting and adopting process does not 
exclude core groups. 
2.2 The Design of the Constitutions 
As vital is the process of constitution-making, so is the actual design of the constitution 
produced. Design choices need to result in a workable constitution and a constitution 
acceptable to the bulk of the populace and/or core elites. More often than not, the incorrect 
design choices flow from a dominant faction of elites wanting to consolidate power or 
their views during constitution-making35. However, in countries with minimal or no 
experience in constitution-making, where foreign actors heavily drive crafting processes, 
and the outcomes can be uncertain, other reasons can be behind the wrong design choices. 
For example, based on his experience as a constitutional advisor in several countries, 
Brandon O’Leary mentions how drafters and constitutional advisors import provisions 
from other systems that might not be appropriate for a particular society36. On the other 
hand, William Partlett, in his study of constitution-making in post-Soviet Europe, 
describes how, at times, drafters, elites, and the populace genuinely believe a particular 
choice might be the right one when it might not be37. 
Wrong design choices can be regarding intrinsic issues pertaining to a country’s core 
values, such as religion or national identity. Two particular instances stand out: 
Afghanistan and Turkey. In both these countries, secular liberal values were pushed upon 
by reformists in societies with large conservative and religious populations, which caused 
problems from the start. In Afghanistan, international actors involved in the 2004 
constitution-making process insisted on such constitutional qualities without considering 
whether domestic actors desired the same. In Afghanistan, the Taliban, who has 
reemerged more potent than ever, has called the liberal Afghanistan Constitution a 
Western import and the biggest obstacle to peace38. Drafting a new Islamic constitution 
is on the top of their agenda for Afghanistan’s future39.  
Similarly, in Turkey, secularism was enshrined as a core value in its 1982 Constitution 
despite arguably over 99 percent of its population being Muslim at that point. Later on, 
disputes arose over the judiciary restricting Islam’s social expressions (such as banning 
wearing hijabs in educational institutions or parties expressing Islamic views) on the 
                                                 
34A. M. Bejarano, R. Segura, The Difference Power Diffusion Makes, in G. Negretto (Ed.), Redrafting 
Constitutions in Democratic Regimes, cit., 133. 
35T. Ginsburg, Z. Elkins, J. Blount, Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter, in Annual Review of 
Law and Social Sciences, Vol. 5, No 1, 2009, 214. 
36See B. O’Leary, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Places, in D. Landau, H. Lerner (Eds.), 
Comparative Constitution Making, cit., 186-211. 
37W. Partlett, Post-Soviet Constitution Making, in D. Landau, H. Lerner (eds), Comparative Constitution 
Making, cit., 539-566. 
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grounds of secularism protected by the constitution40. These contentions eventually 
served as the underlying basis for a series of amendments passed in 2010 by Recep 
Erdoğan’s Dalet Ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) that altered the judiciary’s appointment 
procedures41. This compromised the judiciary’s neutrality and independence and seated 
more judges aligned with AKP’s values on the benches42.  
In cases such as Turkey and Afghanistan, when an amicable resolution over decisive 
issues such as religion or national identity is not possible or realistic, scholars opine how, 
instead of forcibly imposing a view, a better strategy could be to not explicitly decide 
contentious issues but leave them for the future to concretize43. While this does not 
guarantee future resolution, it can prevent constitutional negotiations from breaking down 
or a constitution from being rejected.  
Wrong design choices could also include improper mechanisms for exercising and 
sharing public power in light of a given polity’s socio-political realities and the 
constitution’s purposes. Several democratic constitutions provide for a presidential form 
of government or centralize power because their creators feel it will facilitate better 
governance. Though such systems have their merits, they offer limited power-sharing 
opportunities and reduce the number of veto points in a system44. In countries that lack a 
constitutional culture, such a setup can give rise to dictatorial regimes45, as it has done in 
many post-Soviet states46. Additionally, in deeply divided countries where different 
groups are ready to resort to violence, setups that provide winner-takes-all political 
outcomes can be a recipe for disaster47. 
Another problem that arises specifically in unitary systems in conflict-ridden regimes 
is that the bulk of the country is under the de facto control of regional militias and 
warlords. This makes centralized systems almost unworkable as the central government 
does not exercise authority over the entire territory. All the above problems have recently 
been observed in South Sudan48. Therefore, in specific scenarios, options that allow for 
power-sharing, such as parliamentary systems or decentralization, might be more suited 
even if the state-building process is slower or governance is less than ideal. Furthermore, 
                                                 
40A Bali, Courts and Constitutional Transition: Lessons from the Turkish Case, in International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2013, 679-691.  
41A. Bali, H. Lerner, Religion and Constitution-Making in Comparative Perspective, in D. Landau, H. 
Lerner (Eds.), Comparative Constitution Making, cit., 266-267. 
42A Bali, Courts and Constitutional Transition: Lessons from the Turkish Case, cit.  
43H. Lerner, Constitution-Writing in Deeply Divided Societies: The Incrementalist Approach, in Nations 
and Nationalism, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2010, 66-88 (describing how this can be done by using four tactics (1) 
ambiguity (2) deferral; (3) conflicting principles/provisions; and (4) non-justiciability). 
44Juan Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in J. Linz, A. 
Valenzuela (Eds.), The Failure of Presidential Democracy, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1994, 18.    
45Ibidem.  
46Z. Csaky, Nations in Transit: Dropping the Democratic Façade, Freedom House, Washington DC, 2020, 
1-25. 
47A. Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Deeply Divided Societies, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 
2, 2004, 101.  
48A. Sethi, A Stitch in Times Saves Nine – Why South Sudan Needs a New Constitution ASAP, in Global 
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in instances where a large portion of the country is under the command of armed groups, 
governance structures might need to involve regional militias and warlords and provide 
them with an incentive to cooperate with the central government49. Alienating actors that 
exercise on-ground control does not help the cause of peace or state-building and can 
worsen matters. At times, retaining some aspects of non-democratic regimes as building 
blocks for the new order might be necessary50.  
 
3. Authoritarian Constitution-Making in Democratic Regimes  
There are some salient examples of successful democratic constitution-making, and 
much has been written about them. In a departure from that trend, this part will briefly 
discuss the journey of three successful examples of authoritarian constitution-making in 
Venezuela, Hungary, and Turkey. These three examples a) represent three different 
variants of authoritarian constitution-making; b) have all been drafted legally in the age 
of autocratic legalism and without the use of any military force; c) have comparable levels 
of constitutional cultures (or lack thereof); d) represent different geographic regions with 
very different social, cultural, and economic contexts; and (e) fulfill to some degree all 
criteria’s of a successful attempt at making a constitution mentioned in footnote 12. Hence 
studying these examples provides a varied (yet comparable) insight into authoritarian 
constitution-making in democratic regimes. Though this part does not provide a detailed 
or empirical account of chosen examples, the broad strokes presented help provide 
context for the reasons why would-be-autocrats are successful in their constitution-
making attempts, dealt in Part 451. Additionally, a lot of the moves of would-be-autocrats 
discussed in this part (such as expanding rights in their authoritarian constitutions) would 
not make sense prima facie, but their utility in the larger scheme of things will be 
discussed in Part 4.  
3.1 Venezuela (Authoritarian Constitution-Making by Bypassing the Existing Legal 
System) 
In Venezuela in the 1990s, a grave economic crisis was underway, and the existing 
political regime was in disarray due to corruption scandals52. There was a commonly held 
belief that the current politicians could not tackle the country’s major economic 
ailments53. In this climate, Hugo Chávez, a left-wing populist who claimed to represent 
the common man, ran for president in 1998 as an adversary of the two dominant political 
                                                 
49L, Goodson, Afghanistan’s Long Road to Reconstruction, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14 No. 1, 2003, 
91.     
50D. Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, cit., 980. 
51Moreover, this part to paint broad strokes relies on more detailed individual works (and particularly 
empirical works) on the respective jurisdictions (and their issues) which help in ascertaining adequately the 
broader picture of the respective constitution-making experiences.    
52M. Coppedge, Venezuela Popular Sovereignty Versus Liberal Democracy, in J. I. Domínguez, M. Shifter 
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parties (i.e., Democratic Action and Social Christian Party) and political elites54. His 
central promise was to hold a constitutional assembly to draft a new constitution.55. He 
claimed that such a constitution would put Venezuela on the right socio-economic track56. 
Chávez won the presidency convincingly with a 16 percent lead over his closest 
competitor.  
The existing constitution provided an amendment procedure that allowed for ‘total 
reform’, which could be undertaken by majority approval in the legislature. At that point, 
the legislature was controlled by the two aforesaid political opposition parties whose 
candidates Chávez had defeated in the presidential election57. Rather than negotiating 
with the discredited opposition members, Chávez issued a unilateral decree by going 
outside the legal system and calling for a referendum on convening a constituent assembly 
«aimed at transforming the state and creating a new legal order that allows the effective 
functioning of a social and participative democracy»58. This decree was appealed to the 
Supreme Court by some democracy-supporting groups, but the Supreme Court upheld it 
on the grounds that people have the right to remake their constitutions59.  
The referendum passed decisively with over 82 percent of the vote. The electoral rules 
written by Chávez for selecting members of the Constituent Assembly were designed to 
tilt the scales in favor of his loyalists – commonly known as the Chavistas60. 
Consequently, the Chavistas, who were internally diverse and represented various 
segments of the society, won about 93 percent of seats in the Constituent Assembly61. 
This resulted in the Chavistas having no need to negotiate with the handful of discredited 
opposition members who made it into the Constituent Assembly. Simultaneously, the 
Constituent Assembly exercised its constituent power to close down state institutions such 
as the legislature in which the opposition still had a say and transferred their powers to 
itself62. Again, the Supreme Court acquiesced to these moves. It held that the Constituent 
Assembly, as the direct manifestation of the people’s “constituent power”, was a supra 
institution capable of wielding such authority63. Ironically, finding the Supreme Court a 
potential roadblock, the Constituent Assembly even shut down the Supreme Court soon 
after64.  
                                                 
54K. M. Roberts, Populism and Democracy in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez, in C. Mudde, C.R. Kaltwasser 
(Eds.), Populism in Europe and the Americas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, 144-145. 
55S. Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder, 2008, 95-98. 
56Ibedem.   
57J. Braver, Hannah Arendt in Venezuela: The Supreme Court Battles Hugo Chávez over the Creation of 
the 1999 Constitution, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2016, 565-578.    
58A. Brewer-Carías, The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution making Process as an Instrument for Framing the 
Development of an Authoritarian Political Regime, in L.E. Miller, Framing the State in Times of Transition: 
Case Studies in Constitution Making (Ed.), United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 506. 
59J. Braver, Hannah Arendt in Venezuela: The Supreme Court Battles Hugo Chávez over the Creation of 
the 1999 Constitution, cit., 567-578.  
60M. Bejarano, R. Segura, The Difference Power Diffusion Makes, cit., 143-144. 
61Ibedim.  
62D. Landau, Constituent Power and Constitution Making in Latin America, cit., 578. 
63Ibidem.  
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The new constitution was drafted in consultation with trade unions, civil society 
organizations, professional associations, and neighborhood organizations65. One study 
mentions how organizations submitted 624 proposals and had more than 50 percent of 
their recommendations accepted for inclusion in the constitution66.  
This constitution gave Chávez substantial power to push through his authoritarian 
program. At first glance, containing all the emblematic elements of a democratic 
constitution such as a bill of rights (including social-welfare guarantees), courts with the 
power of judicial review, fourth branch institutions, etc. it (1) created an ultra-strong 
presidency which allowed Chávez to run for three terms in contrast to the one-term 
previously allowed (2) weakened the federal nature of Venezuela’s constitutional system 
(3) converted the bicameral legislature into a unicameral one (4) increased the powers of 
the state and (5) loosened civilian control over the military67.  
This constitution was then put to the vote in a referendum wherein it was passed with 
a 71.3 majority.  
3.2 Hungary (Authoritarian Constitution-Making Within the Existing Legal System) 
Venezuela illustrates Chávez going outside the existing legal order to draft a new 
constitution. Nonetheless, this is not always what happens. Hungary is a case in point 
here. The Hungarian story began with citizens growing tired of political scandals and the 
divided left-wing government’s ineptitude in tackling the economy68. Viktor Orbán, a 
nationalist right-wing politician, took advantage of this situation and ran for prime 
minister in 201069. Orbán had made his vision for Hungary extremely clear before the 
election. In 2009 he promised how «politics in Hungary will no longer be defined by a 
dualist power space […] instead, a large governing party will emerge in the centre of the 
political stage that will be able to formulate national policy, not through constant debates 
but through a natural representation of interests»70. Orbán fiercely rejected the liberal 
values of the European Union and vowed to build an “illiberal” democracy71.  
Hungarians from different walks of life showed their support for Orbán’s Fidesz Party 
and its populist message72, giving its coalition control of 68 percent of parliamentary 
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66D. Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, cit., 942. 
67O. G. Encarnación, Venezuela’s “Civil Society Coup”, in World Policy Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2002, 41.  
68G. Negretto, S. Wandan, Democratic Constitutional Replacements and Majoritarian Politics, in G. 
Negretto (Ed.), Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic Regimes, cit., 158. 
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in Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2018, 308-321.  
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Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, 245. 
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seats73. This electoral outcome crossed the two-thirds majority required by the existing 
constitution to pass constitutional amendments. Once in office, the Orbán government 
wasted no time in protecting and consolidating their coalition’s victory74. The first target 
was the constitutional court, where the government changed the system for nominating 
constitutional judges, expanded the constitutional court, and limited its power of judicial 
review75. As soon as the court was not a major concern, the Orbán government passed 
hundreds of new laws and amendments. Including those impacting the right to seek 
information from the government, nationality rules, protections for the family, churches’ 
role in society, etc 76. The most important of these changes abolished the constitutional 
provision that required a four-fifths majority in the parliament to adopt the procedural 
rules for drafting a new constitution77.  
In mid-2010, the Orbán government announced plans for drafting a new constitution, 
defending it by citing the failure of previous efforts to adopt a new constitution as 
Hungary was still operating under its communist-era constitution (albeit a heavily 
amended one that had transformed the communist-era political system)78. Subsequently, 
the Orbán government instituted the first round of constitution-making by establishing an 
ad hoc committee that included members of the opposition79. This committee was tasked 
with preparing fundamental principles for the new constitution in consultation with the 
public and civil society80. The committee submitted the constitutional principles to the 
parliament on 20 December 201081.  
With crucial institutional checks weakened, the Orbán government proceeded 
expeditiously with the second round of constitutional drafting. The procedural rules 
adopted by the Fidesz-controlled parliament ensured that the outcome of the first round 
of drafting was not binding in any way (though the Fidesz government took principles 
from that round of drafting that benefited their goals)82. The final version of the new 
constitution was introduced in parliament as an ordinary piece of legislation and was 
approved quickly by the Fidesz coalition’s votes on 15 March 2011. This new constitution 
eroded the secular character of Hungary by giving strong emphasis to Christianity 
                                                 
73A. Bozóki, András, Mainstreaming The Far Right: Cultural Politics In Hungary, in Revue D’études 
Comparatives Est-Ouest, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2016, 91-99. 
74G. Halmai, The Making Of “Illiberal Constitutionalism” With or Without a New Constitution, in D. 
Landau, H. Lerner (Eds.), Comparative Constitution Making, cit., 305.   
75M. Bánkuti, G. Halmai, K. L. Scheppele, Disabling the Constitution, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, 
No. 3, 2012, 138-146. 
76G. Halmai, The Making Of “Illiberal Constitutionalism” With or Without a New Constitution, cit., 305. 
77Ibidem.  
78I. Szikinger, Hungary’s Pliable Constitution, in J. Zielonka (Ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern 
Europe: Volume I: Institutional Engineering, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 406–430. 
79G. Negretto, S. Wandan, Democratic Constitutional Replacements and Majoritarian Politics, cit., 158. 
80Idem, 161.  
81Ibidem.  
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(Hungary’s predominant religion), created a government with very few checks, and 
weakened human rights protections83.  
3.3 Turkey (Authoritarian Constitution-Making Through Ordinary Constitutional 
Amendments) 
Besides these two instances of constitution-remaking, there is a subtler way 
constitutions are remade, i.e., using ordinary constitutional amendments to rewrite 
constitutions wholly and incrementally in ways that result in a complete revision of the 
constitution84. For methodological ease, most works on constitution-making consider 
constitution-making as only those events when drafters themselves claim that they are 
creating a new constitution. Nonetheless, rewriting constitutions over time using ordinary 
amendment procedures and as part of a singular project is too important an issue to omit 
in the study of constitution-making – whether authoritarian or otherwise. In fact, this 
appears to be the trend that would-be autocrats seem inclined to follow going forward85. 
Turkey is a paradigm of this form of authoritarian constitution-remaking. Over the 
years, weak coalition governments have struggled to maintain stability, creating frequent 
power vacuums86. These power vacuums have occasioned military coups87. The weakness 
of the governments also adversely affected the Turkish economy, resulting in a financial 
crisis in 200188. Another characteristic of the Turkish political elites was their espousal 
of secularism, which formed a vital tenet of the 1982 Turkish Constitution. Despite Islam 
being the dominant religion, several parties over the years were banned by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court for promoting Islamic values89.  
In this background, Recep Erdoğan’s AKP came to power in 2002. AKP sold itself as 
a majoritarian Islamic right-wing party that opposed the existing political order90. The 
party stood for religious freedom, a liberal market economy, and membership in the 
European Union91. During its first term, it pursued economic reforms while building its 
religious base without alienating the secular opposition92. By AKP’s second term, 
Erdoğan realized that the secular opposition was a severe obstacle to the AKP’s agendas 
                                                 
83M. Bánkuti, G. Halmai, K.L. Scheppele, From Separation of Powers to a Government without Checks: 
Hungary’s Old and New Constitutions, in G.A. Toth (Ed.), Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On 
Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law, CEU Press, Budapest, 2012, 237-268. 
84This generally happens for one of these three reasons (1) lack of sufficient representation in governmental 
bodies that carry out formal constitutional change (2) constraints due to constitutional norms or procedures 
(3) easier and subtler way to go about things.  
85Two high-risk countries - Poland and India - have started to make use of this model.  
86O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism in Turkey, in M.A. Graber, S. Levinson, M. Tushnet, Constitutional 
Democracy in Crisis?, cit., 342.    
87Ibidem.   
88Ibidem.  
89A Bali, Courts and Constitutional Transition: Lessons from the Turkish Case, cit. 
90M. Çınar, From Moderation to De-moderation: Democratic Backsliding of the AKP in Turkey, in J. L. 
Esposito, L. Z. Rahim, N. Ghobadzadeh, The Politics of Islamism, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018, 129. 
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and possibly its existence93. Thus, began Erdoğan’s project of dismantling secularism and 
consolidating power which some believe had always been the ultimate plan 94.  
Initially, this project started with curbing free speech, closing the space for civil society 
to operate, and selective prosecution of political opponents for crimes such as tax evasion, 
fraud, and money laundering95. The primary constitutional remaking took the form of 
three successful public referendums in 2007, 2010, and 2017. In Turkey, the constitution 
can be amended by either a public referendum or a 2/3rd vote of the legislature. Some of 
the amendments resulted in adding liberal values. For example, these amendments 
increased protection for minorities in Turkey, expanded the right to privacy, and barred 
military courts from trying civilians96. Nevertheless, the significant changes due to these 
amendments resulted in abolishing the prime minister’s office, diminishing the 
legislature’s role, and transforming the country from a parliamentary system to a 
presidential system wherein the president was accorded unfettered powers97. As 
previously described, these amendments also curtailed the judiciary’s independence and 
packed it with loyalists.  
Early on, Erdoğan had claimed that the reforms were necessary to limit the military 
that had staged four coups in recent history and because of Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union98. Erdoğan later shifted to more aggressive Islamic-cum-Turkish 
nationalism rhetoric and justified reforms as the only way Turkey could achieve stability 
and security99. During the 2017 referendum, Erdoğan had implied that opposing these 
reforms would be akin to siding with terrorists or the supporters of Fethullah Gulen, the 
secular scholar whom Erdoğan had accused of plotting the failed coup of 2016100. 
After the first two rounds of amendments, 117 out of the 177 articles no longer stood 
in their original forms101. The recent 2017 amendment package further revised or repealed 
76 articles of the already revised Constitution102. These amendments’ cumulative effect 
completely changed how Turkey’s government operated and overhauled the Constitution 
to the extent that it bore no resemblance to the 1982 Constitution. Debatably the changes 
made to the Turkish Constitution go beyond mere revision and could be classified as what 
Richard Albert terms “dismemberment”103. 
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4. Conducting An Autopsy - Why Are Would-Be-Autocrats Successful In Making 
Authoritarian Constitutions? 
Part 2 stated how most instances of constitution-making, particularly democratic ones, 
are not successful. A curious case emerges in Part 3 where would-be-autocrats draft 
authoritarian constitutions in democratic regimes and do it quite successfully. Moreover, 
they do not use force, as was the case with the attempts at democratic constitution-making 
post the Arab Spring. The question then arises: How do they manage it, and how are 
authoritarian constitutions accepted in established democratic regimes? This part will 
attempt to conduct an autopsy using the three previously discussed examples. This part 
will largely limit its analysis to the cases discussed in Part 3 and only make limited 
references to instances beyond Venezuela, Hungary, and Turkey. However, similar 
considerations apply to other instances of authoritarian constitution-making in democratic 
regimes, both that have happened in the past and ones currently underway. 
4.1 Several Elements of An Optimal Constitution-Making Process 
While exclusionary and deficient in their own ways104, all the three constitution-
making instances mentioned above had some aspects of an optimal constitution-making 
process, which helps develop attachment for the respective constitutions. In Venezuela, 
there was a referendum for calling a constituent assembly and approving the constitution. 
Similarly, in Turkey, all three amendment packages were passed by referendums though 
they could have been passed legislatively as well. Erdoğan had explicitly stated that he 
would not get the constitutional changes passed legislatively if the referendums failed105. 
It is worth noting that such referendums seldom fail because would-be-authoritarians 
control the referendum questions, and citizens are unlikely to develop critical views of 
large constitutional texts or amendment packages106. This is especially the case when 
referendums questions are window-dressed perfectly with democratic innovations, as was 
witnessed in the referendums fielded in Turkey.  
In both Venezuela and Hungary, the drafting bodies of the constitutions were 
democratically elected. Further, as mentioned earlier, though these drafting bodies were 
comprised mainly of allies of the would-be-autocrat, they still reflected or represented 
broad sections of the society. Those missing were the weak, divided, and discredited 
oppositions or minorities, which were not “core” enough anymore to create problems for 
the constitution’s working. Moreover, the respective drafting bodies considered civil 
society and public input, which did find its way into the constitution. In most cases, such 
participation was only done to create an illusion and did not affect the structural systems 
that would-be-autocrats intended to establish. Yet, these are precisely the kind of 
                                                 
104This sub section’s claim is not that the drafting processes in the three countries were perfect. All of these 
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measures that help build a sense of attachment towards a constitution. Curiously many 
instances of democratic constitution-making do not even come close to their authoritarian 
counterparts on this front107. Clearly, would-be-autocrats know perfectly well how to 
work the system. 
4.2 Absence of Any Nonconformity Issues 
In the cases of Afghanistan and Turkey, the constitutions, did not fit into claims of 
domestic ownership because they were considered contrary and in conflict with the bulk 
of the populaces core values and identity. Similarly, Hungary’s last constitution was seen 
as a relic of its communist past, which people wanted to move away from108.  
The constitutions drafted by would-be-autocrats do not face nonconformity issues as 
they either promote majoritarian values or do not champion any controversial counter-
majoritarian values. The preamble of Hungary’s 2011 Constitution makes explicit 
references to the majority Christian religion by pronouncements such as «We are proud 
that our king Saint Stephen built the Hungarian State on solid ground and made our 
country a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago» and «We recognize the role 
of Christianity in preserving nationhood». Likewise, while the Turkish constitutional 
amendments did not expressly introduce Islam into the Constitution or alter the secular 
nature of the Constitution (another prima facie democratic innovation), it was apparent 
that the 2010 amendments which changed the judicial appointment mechanisms 
facilitated a judiciary that comprised more judges aligned with AKP’s majoritarian 
ideology. This was intended to prevent the judiciary from suppressing expressions of 
Islam like it had done in the past.  
On the other hand, though not advocating any particular majoritarian value or ideology 
(which was almost a non-issue in Venezuela), the Venezuelan Constitution did not 
promote any counter-majoritarian one either. Nevertheless, it was laden with social 
promises and provisions for organizations such as trade unions, farmers, neighborhood 
associations, etc., which appeased diverse sections of the society. A survey fielded in 
Venezuela showed how different groups were generally satisfied with the eventual 
constitution109. Such tactics also serve an added function. They allow would-be-autocrats 
to add legitimacy to their authoritarian constitutions and confuse domestic and 
international critics110. 
4.3 Workable Constitutions 
Unlike with new regimes, in established democracies, the worries of a constitution’s 
unworkability are fewer, as state machinery and enforcing institutions are present and in 
working conditions. The risk of severe violence that can turn into a civil war is also lower 
in established democracies. As far as isolated incidents of protests or violence are 
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concerned, would-be autocrats have the state machinery and popular backing to suppress 
them without many roadblocks111. Turkey witnessed a coup attempt in 2016, but because 
AKP was stable and established by that time, the party easily quelled it. Quite the reverse, 
Erdoğan used the failed coup as an excuse to centralize more power. None of the three 
countries had the problem of de facto ground control lying with armed or military groups 
that would make a centralized system problematic. In fact, even during its democratic 
heyday, Hungary was operating as a unitary system. The major losers in authoritarian 
constitution-making processes are weak opposition political parties and/or minorities who 
lack the political power to become a problem for the constitutions’ working. Since the 
purpose of authoritarian constitutions is precisely to create an authoritarian state, 
authoritarian constitutions work precisely as intended. It is doubtful that a carefully 
drafted authoritarian constitution would result in a democratic state instead of an 
authoritarian one. 
4.4 Failure of Constitutional Safeguards and Institutional Checks 
Constitutions often contain safeguards like judicial institutions or a combination of 
revision clauses, total reform clauses, unconstitutional constitutional amendments, 
amendment procedure clauses, etc., to prevent authoritarian constitution-making. 
However, these options in all the cases described above failed to work for different 
reasons. When it came to constitutional law provisions that prevent legal change in 
unilateral or abusive ways, they failed because embedding a particular rule in a 
constitution does not automatically make governments play by the rules112. Governments 
abide by constitutional provisions not aligned with their interests when the costs of not 
doing so would be extremely high113. This generally happens when flouting constitutional 
provisions can usher in massive protests or cause the citizenry to vote against 
incumbents114. The popularity of would-be-autocrats coupled with the weak state of the 
opposition parties made constitutional provisions inadequate checks. This is precisely 
why the total reform clause in Venezuela’s Constitution did not prevent Chávez from 
drafting an authoritarian constitution.  
The option of judicial institutions also rears its head in such situations. As bodies 
without the “power of the purse or sword”, such institutions are dependent on the elected 
branches for their functioning and the enforcement of their decisions. The same dynamics 
as witnessed with constitutional law provisions exist when it comes to the government 
enforcing judgments of judicial institutions. Consequently, judicial institutions are wary 
of having their decisions ignored by the elected branches, which can affect these 
institutions’ legitimacy and credibility115. In worst-case scenarios, judicial institutions not 
only risk having their decisions ignored but are also in danger of facing retaliation from 
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elected branches in the form of court curbing measures116. In turn, judicial institutions 
either end up siding with would-be-autocrats or utilizing avoidance cannons and letting 
autocrats proceed with their projects. This explains why the Venezuelan Supreme Court 
allowed Chávez to move ahead unilaterally. Contrariwise, in Turkey and Hungary, the 
respective would-be-autocrats started their projects by first attacking the judiciary and 
compromising its independence. Hence, by the time questions regarding constitutional 
replacements came up, the judiciary was no longer independent117. Rather than playing a 
positive role, they ended up themselves being facilitators of democratic backsliding118. 
 
4.5 Lack of United Opposition Forces  
Perhaps the most important reason would-be-autocrats succeeded in drafting 
authoritarian constitutions is the lack of united opposition forces to confront them. To 
compound matters, opposition forces in all the cases discussed above were weak, divided, 
discredited, and often embroiled in their own scandals and internal discords119. As such, 
they did not put up any meaningful resistance to would-be-autocrats attempts to redraft 
constitutions. In fact, in Venezuela, the opposition did have both electoral leverage and 
support across society, media, military, and courts but could not unite and put up a 
resistance against Chávez120. Hence, would-be-autocrats could draft authoritarian 
constitutions unilaterally and without negotiating with the opposition or without them 
holding out.  
For the most part, would-be autocrats have only been stopped in their attempts to make 
authoritarian constitutions when they were confronted by united opposition forces acting 
strategically. This is why Poland has been unable to draft one despite plans to do so since 
2017121. Situations with united oppositions acting strategically are also responsible for 
creating the circumstances for constitutional safeguards and judicial institutions to 
function adequately122. In 2008, when Evo Morales remade the Bolivian Constitution, he 
was forced to abide by the revision clause and could not draft the constitution he intended 
to as he was faced with a powerful opposition with considerable sway, support, and 
electoral presence across state institutions123. Similarly, when different judicial 
institutions precluded Honduras President Zelaya in 2009 from calling for a referendum 
on whether or not a constituent assembly should be constituted, both the opposition party 
                                                 
116Idem, 169-179. 
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and Zelaya’s own party fiercely and publicly opposed the referendum124. Such a political 
environment provided different judicial institutions with the conditions to pass judgments 
against a populist (and popular) president. However, these examples have been exceptions 
and not the norm. Worldwide, existing political establishments are in complete shambles 
with a high level of discontent among the population, laying the foundation for would-
be-autocrats to emerge125.  
5. Epilogue 
This article surveyed three types of authoritarian constitution-making in democratic 
regimes and examined why would-be-autocrats find more success than their democratic 
counterparts. It listed five reasons to explain the latter, namely 1) several elements of an 
optimal constitution-making process; 2) absence of any nonconformity issues; 3) 
workable constitutions; 4) failure of constitutional safeguards and institutional checks; 5) 
lack of united opposition forces.  
Considering the general populace’s support for would-be-autocrats constitutions, their 
efficiency in drafting one, and the weak state of opposition parties in most democracies, 
the grim reality is that it is unlikely that attempts to draft authoritarian constitutions can 
be foiled in most cases.  
There are two essential points worth making in conclusion. First, in countries where 
political parties are in disarray and the public is disillusioned with the political climate, 
political parties need to start realizing the consequences if they do not get their houses in 
order and address public demands. The cases discussed here (and several others) are 
enough evidence to show how the story usually unfolds. Scholars have suggested that 
beyond just putting their house in order and uniting, democratic political forces might 
require a rethinking of democracy’s goals and aspirations for it to be sustainable in the 
long term126.   
Second, authoritarian projects take years to complete. Turkey passed its constitutional 
amendments over a decade and, in early 2021, declared plans to draft a new Islamic 
constitution from scratch. Orbán’s authoritarian project has been in action for a similar 
period, despite promulgating an authoritarian constitution in 2011. Three years after the 
2011 Constitution, Orbán denounced European Union internationalism and declared his 
intentions to transform Hungary into an illiberal democracy. In Venezuela, Chávez 
drafted his Constitution in 1999, but he and his successor Nicolás Maduro have continued 
expanding the authoritarian project well into the present.  
Thus, opposition forces have a role to play, even if they are not in a position to stop a 
would-be autocrat’s initial constitution-making attempt because their authoritarian 
project still has a long way before it reaches its apogee. This becomes particularly relevant 
when would-be autocrats use the Turkish route to remake constitutions. Hence, there are 
many windows of opportunity available to prevent more democratic backsliding. The 
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onus is on opposition forces in countries facing authoritarian threats to keep aside their 
differences, sort out internal problems, rally around a common enemy, and use their 
institutional leverage optimally. The longer the autocrat stays in power, the harder it 
becomes to dislodge them because they start increasing their hold over accountability 
institutions and keep removing checks on their powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
